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RECOGNIZING TRIBAL JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL COURTS
THROUGH THE LENS OF COMITY
INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, on the sparsely populated Uintah and Ouray Res-
ervation in northeastern Utah, a man was charged with assaulting his
domestic partner.' Little did he know that, because this was his third do-
mestic assault charge, he will not appear before a Ute judge in tribal
court. This is his third strike. The full force of a federal recidivist statute
strikes him out-for up to five years.2 His name is Adam Shavanaux and
he is a member of the Ute Indian Tribe. Because he is a tribal member
and the crimes he committed were on the reservation, his previous con-
victions were in Ute tribal court. Tribal courts, however, are bound nei-
ther by the United States Constitution nor the Bill of Rights3 and conse-
quently provide different protections than domestic American courts.4
Tribal members, for example, do not have the right to free legal counsel.'
This is particularly important to Mr. Shavanaux because he cannot afford
an attorney.6 His two prior misdemeanor domestic assault convictions
were made while Mr. Shavanaux was unrepresented.7 The recidivist stat-
ute commands that he be charged in federal court, and his federal public
defenders assert that his prior convictions should not be allowed as pred-
icate offenses because they were handed down without the benefit of
professional legal representation.8
Because tribal courts do not provide the same procedural protec-
tions as state and federal courts, there is a debate as to how state and fed-
eral courts should handle tribal judgments that come across their dockets.
Should tribal judgments be entitled to full faith and credit under the Full
Faith and Credit Act 9 or be analyzed using principles of international
comity?10 This Comment argues that tribal judgments should be treated
1. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995 (10th Cir. 2011).
2. Domestic Assault by an Habitual Offender, 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
3. The Constitution and Bill of Rights do not apply because Indian tribes were, before the
American Republic, viewed as co-equal sovereign states. See discussion infra Part lB.
4. See discussion infra Part I.C.2. Throughout this paper, I will use "American courts" to
refer to federal and state courts. This is in contrast to "tribal courts," which do not fall within the
same structure.
5. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(1)(b) ("[B]ut no Defendant shall have the right to have
appointed professional counsel provided at the Tribe's expense."), available at
http://www.narforg/nill/Codes/uteuocode/utebodytl2.htm.
6. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 996.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
10. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (noting that comity is "complex and elusive-[it considers] the degree of deference that a
domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum.").
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as foreign judgments and be recognized using international comity prin-
ciples" because the relationship between tribes and American jurisdic-
tions does not mirror the state-federal relationship, which is based on full
faith and credit between judgments from different jurisdictions. Although
Congress retains ultimate control, tribes have much leeway to exercise
their sovereignty in internal affairs.12 Because they are not fully within
the federal framework and are not bound by the same rules as state and
federal courts, the principles of international comity are the best means
for American courts to recognize tribal judgments.
Part I frames how Indian tribes are treated in the United States. It
briefly explores the history of legal relationships with Indian tribes, from
equal treatment as sovereign states when Europeans first crossed the At-
lantic, through a century of pulling tribes under the federal domain, to
eventual federal legislative supremacy over Indian tribes. This Comment
also analyzes the circuit split regarding the use of un-counseled tribal
convictions to prove predicate offenses. Part II discusses United States v.
Shavanaux'3 and summarizes Mr. Shavanaux's Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment claims. Part III explores the difference between a full
faith and credit approach and a comity analysis of tribal judgments, and
concludes by finding that international comity principles are more ap-
propriate for Indian tribes. Part IV analyzes Shavanaux using the princi-
ples of international comity and explores whether the right to counsel is a
fundamental due process requirement for the comity analysis.
I. BACKGROUND: THE TRIBAL-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
The foundation for understanding United States v. Shavanaux
comes from understanding the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and tribal governments. This story is a long and, at times, ugly
one.14 From initial European contact with Native Americans, tribal sov-
ereignty has been chipped away. In the early years of the United States,
the federal government began to bring tribes within its administration
and under its protection.'5 Now, tribes are neither part of the United
States because they still retain many aspects of sovereignty nor are they
foreign states because Congress retains ultimate authority over them.
This state of limbo creates difficulties when American and tribal legal
systems interact.
11. For a thorough discussion of comity, see discussion infra Part IlIl.A.I.
12. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
13. 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011).
14. See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
841, 841-43 (1990).
15. See DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 7 (2001).
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A. United States' Treatment ofIndian Tribes
By the time the United States declared independence, there was a
well-established framework for dealing with Native American tribes.
Spanish theological jurists in the 1600s recognized the sovereignty of
Indian tribes and treated them as they would other colonial powers-that
is, as sovereign states.' 6 This sovereign equality, however, began to
erode in the mid-1700s as the British took over some tribal administra-
tive responsibilities.' 7 By 1781, the Articles of Confederation asserted
that the national government had authority over Indian tribes.' 8 The Con-
stitution, however, continued to recognize that Indian tribes are "distinct
from the United States"' 9 in the express language of the Commerce
Clause.20 Early American interactions with Indian tribes were made
through treaties. 2 1 In 1784, George Washington recommended that a trea-
ty resolving a territorial dispute with the Six Nations be submitted to the
22same formal ratification process as a treaty with a foreign sovereign.
Subsequent peace,23 trade, 2 4 and land acquisition25 treaties began to dis-
favor tribal interests as the United States pushed westward. Congress
eventually ended the practice of making treaties with tribes, but it left
tribal sovereignty intact.2 6
After the Constitution was ratified, the limits of tribal sovereignty
were predominantly shaped by three Supreme Court decisions, referred
to as the "Marshall Trilogy."2 7 These cases established that although
tribes were not quite foreign states,28 they were certainly not part of the
United States. 29 Chief Justice Marshall noted that because federal and
state governments "plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a [foreign]
state . . . the courts are bound by those acts" affirming tribal sovereign-
ty.30 However, recognizing Indian tribes "as distinct, independent politi-
16. See CHARLES WILKINSON, THE AM. INDIAN RES. INST., INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN
GOVERNMENTS 4 (2d ed. 2004).
17. See id.
18. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 ("The United States in Congress
assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of . .. regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians . . . .").
19. See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 15, at 5.
20. Indian tribes are separate from foreign and domestic states. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3 ("[The Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.").
21. See WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 4-8.
22. See id. at 93.
23. See, e.g., Treaty with the Choctaw, U.S.-Choctaw, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333;
WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 96-97.
24. See, e.g., Treaty with the Sioux, U.S.-Sioux, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635; WILKINSON,
supra note 16, at 93-94.
25. See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, U.S.-Creek, Aug. 9, 1814, 7 Stat. 120; WILKINSON,
supra note 16, at 96.
26. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006); WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 97.
27. See WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 5.
28. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1831).
29. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559, 561 (1832).
30. "State," in this context, refers to foreign states. See Cherokee Nalion, 30 U.S. at 16.
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cal communities, retaining their original natural rights" does not mean
tribal sovereignty is absolute. 3 ' Tribes are "domestic dependent na-
tions ,,32 "distinct communit[ies] occupying [their] own territory."3 3 Alt-
hough the Court did not determine that tribes are within the federal
framework, the extent of tribal sovereignty depends on the will of the
federal government. 3 4
Given that tribes retain a level of independence, the question be-
comes how does Congress justify its authority over tribes? The federal
government justifies its control over Indian tribes as an inherent "plenary
power,"35 which means that Congress has "full and complete power" to
regulate tribal affairs. 3 6 The source of the plenary power stems 37 from the
Indian Commerce Clause, 38 the Treaty Clause, 39 and a principle in inter-
national law granting conquerors sovereignty and ownership over con-
quered land.4 0 Although Congress abolished the power to make treaties
with Indian tribes in 187141 and conquest has lost favor as an acceptable
tool for advancing national interests, 42 the Commerce Clause remains as
justification for federal supremacy over tribes.43 Regardless of the origi-
nal justification, Congress's power is very broadly interpreted."
B. Effect of Congressional Power over Tribes
Until Congress acts to limit tribal authority, Indian nations have
many of the powers of a sovereign state.45 By being brought within the
administrative protection of the United States, "Indian tribes have not
31. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
32. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
33. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
34. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 ("[Tribes'] relation to the Unites States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian.").
35. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 397-98 (1986 ed.).
36. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998); STEPHEN L. PEVAR,
THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 59 (3d ed. 2002).
37. See PEVAR, supra note 36, at 58-59; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-04
(2004) (explaining the sources of Congress's plenary power over Indian tribes).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have power] ... to regulate Commerce
... with the Indian Tribes. . . .").
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
40. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823) ("The title by conquest is acquired and
maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits."); see also Robert N. Clinton, Comity &
Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration of Tribal Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. I,
26-27 (2004).
41. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006); WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 97.
42. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (outlawing the use of force as a tool of foreign poli-
cy).
43. See Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 257-58 (1992); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974).
44. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-03 (2004) (describing congressional power
over tribes); PEVAR, supra note 36, at 59.
45. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 n.7 (1978) (discussing federal court
decisions which "exempt[] Indian tribes from constitutional provisions addressed specifically to
State or Federal Governments"); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
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given up their full sovereignty."4 And because tribes are sovereign states
that existed before the Constitution, they "have historically been regard-
ed as unconstrained" by constitutional limitations. 4 7 Of particular im-
portance to United States v. Shavanaux because of Mr. Shavanaux's un-
counseled convictions, the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian
tribes.48 However, Congress's plenary powers allow legislative action to
strip tribes of independent authority. 49 As the Court articulated in Talton
v. Mayes,50 "all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authori-
ty of the United States."
As an exercise of this plenary power, Congress passed the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).52 ICRA grants Bill of Rights-like pro-
tections to tribal members53 and gives federal courts broad authority to
review and overrule tribal decisions that violate ICRA protections. 54 Im-
posing the Bill of Rights itself was not done because it would not take
into account the unique needs of Indian tribes. 5 One right that was not
fully exported was the right to counsel-ICRA only guarantees defend-
ants the right to counsel at their own expense.56 Recognizing that requir-
ing tribes to provide public defenders would impose "undue financial
hardship," Congress acquiesced to tribal leaders. 7 Some tribes, however,
provide counsel for indigent defense5 or, as Mr. Shavanaux's Ute Tribe
does, allow non-lawyer "advocates" to represent defendants. 5 9 But be-
cause tribes are not subject to the Bill of Rights, any measures that are
more protective than IRCA are left to the tribe's discretion.60
46. United States v. wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
47. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 ("As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitu-
tion, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions . . .
48. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896).
49. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 ("In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sover-
eignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status.").
50. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
51. Talton, 163 U.S. at 384.
52. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
53. See id. § 1302.
54. See PEVAR, supra note 36, at 278. For a discussion of ICRA's legislative history, which
emphasizes the federal government's interest in maintaining tribal integrity and self-governance, see
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66-70 (1978).
55. PEVAR, supra note 36, at 280 (explaining that full Bill of Rights protections were not
conferred because some protections, for example the Establishment Clause, would be detrimental to
ICRA's purpose of protecting individual rights while maintaining tribal integrity and identity).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6).
57. See PEVAR, supra note 36, at 280, 282.
58. See CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 319-
20(2004).
59. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(l)(b), available at
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/uteuocode/utebodytl2.htm ("The Defendant may ... be represented
by an adult enrolled Tribal member. . . .").
60. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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C. Circuit Split on Recognizing Tribal Convictions: Ant v. Spotted Eagle
Various courts have approached the question of whether an un-
counseled tribal conviction, obtained in compliance with ICRA, may be
used as a predicate offense to prove guilt in a subsequent federal three-
strike prosecution. Two schools of thought have arisen. The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Ant,6 ' determined that prior un-
counseled convictions could not be used as predicate offenses. The
Tenth62 and Eighth63 Circuits, however, adopted the Montana Supreme
Court's reasoning in State v. Spotted Eagle," which allows courts to rec-
ognize un-counseled tribal convictions as qualifying predicate offenses. 6 5
Although not explicitly mentioned, both results, though different in out-
come, draw heavily from comity principles. In analyzing whether un-
counseled tribal convictions should be recognized, the courts determine
whether the conviction meets fundamental due process requirements
needed to justify enforcing a judgment from a jurisdiction with different
procedural protections.
1. Ant: Would the Conviction Be Valid in Federal Court?
On October 27, 1986, the body of a young woman was found on the
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation in southeastern Montana.6 6 Over
a month later, authorities went to Francis Floyd Ant's house, interrogated
him, and obtained a confession without Ant having been advised of his
right to an attorney.67 After the confession, the police arrested Ant and
read him his Miranda rights. At his tribal arraignment on charges of
assault and battery, Ant pled guilty, again without counsel.69 Tribes can-
not sentence anyone for more than a year in jail70 and the federal gov-
ernment has concurrent jurisdiction over felonies,71 so Ant was charged
with manslaughter in federal court. At that trial, he sought to suppress his
tribal court guilty plea because that evidence was obtained in violation of
his Miranda rights.7 2 The district court denied the motion to suppress
61. 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
62. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999.
63. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting, additionally,
that "Supreme Court authority in this area is unclear" and "reasonable decision-makers may differ"
in their conclusions and interpretations of the Sixth Amendment).
64. 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003).
65. Id. at 1245.
66. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1390.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1390-91.
70. Tribes can impose a maximum sentence of no more than one year, a $5,000 fine, or both.
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (2006); see also COHEN, supra note 35, at
769 (enumerating the punishments that an Indian tribe may impose).
71. The Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885 grants the federal government concurrent jurisdic-
tion over major crimes, such as rape, murder, and sexual assault. Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885,
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006); see also COHEN, supra note 35, at 742-45, 759 (discussing jurisdiction-
al issues under the Indian Country Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act).
72. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1391.
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because "[c]omity and respect for legitimate tribal proceedings requires
that this Court not disparage those proceedings by suppressing them from
evidence in this case."7 3 After Ant was convicted and sentenced to three
years and a $50 fine, he appealed.74
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether an un-counseled guilty plea in
tribal court can be used in a later federal prosecution for a repeat offend-
er statute. The later efficacy of a tribal conviction is predicated on its
initial validity. 6 Review of tribal judgments uses a "clearly erroneous"
standard,77 out of respect for judgments issued by a sovereign, competent
court.78 Earlier convictions, even from "proceedings in different jurisdic-
tions," can generally be used. 79 Therefore, to disallow use of the convic-
tion, the court must determine that the conviction was constitutionally
deficient.80
To do this, the Ninth Circuit asked whether Ant's un-counseled plea
would have been accepted in federal court.8 ' Stressing that it was not
reviewing the tribal conviction, the court merely sought to ensure that
evidence on which a federal conviction was predicated comports with the
Constitution.82 For Sixth Amendment challenges, defendants must have
access to counsel during all "critical stage[s]" of trial.8 Therefore, the
court concluded, even though the conviction complied with tribal law
and ICRA, any procedure that violates the Constitution cannot be used in
84a later federal court prosecution.
2. Spotted Eagle: Respect for Tribal Sovereignty
Like Ant, Spotted Eagle addressed how courts should deal with un-
counseled tribal convictions.8 5 In September 2001, a Montana sheriff
found Eugene Spotted Eagle slumped against his pickup truck.86 After




76. See id. at 1391-92.
77. See id. at 1392 (citing Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir.
1984)).
78. See id. (citing Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Or., 783
F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1986)).
79. See id. at 1392-93.
80. See id at 1393 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) (denying the
prosecution use of evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner)).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 1396 ("[W]e have looked beyond the validity of the tribal conviction itself and have
reviewed the actual tribal proceedings to determine if they were in conformity with the Constitution-
al requirements for federal prosecutions in federal court.").
83. Ant did not have counsel when he entered his guilty plea. Therefore, the court determined,
at this "critical stage," Ant's lack of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment. See id at 1393-94
(citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961)).
84. See id. at 1396.
85. See State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1240 (Mont. 2003).
86. Id. at 1240.
5292012]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. However, this DUI was
Spotted Eagle's fifth conviction-he had been convicted four previous
times in Blackfeet tribal court.88 Under Montana law, the fourth or any
subsequent DUI conviction is a felony. 89 Similar to Ant, Spotted Eagle
moved to dismiss the felony charge because the four prior tribal convic-
tions were made without Spotted Eagle having counsel. 90 The Montana
district court, however, denied the motion noting that "the judicial policy
of the State of Montana is to treat Tribal Court judgments with the same
deference shown to decisions of foreign nations as a matter of comity"9 1
and that Spotted Eagle's prior convictions comported with ICRA and
tribal law.9 2
Despite the similar issue of law, the Montana Supreme Court distin-
guished Spotted Eagle from Ant.9 3 Again, the analysis started with a valid
tribal conviction under ICRA and tribal law.94 The court then analyzed
permissible uses of un-counseled conviction in state and federal court.
Reiterating the U.S. Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court noted
that a conviction without counsel is valid so long as the defendant is
charged with a misdemeanor and is not sentenced to imprisonment. 95
These convictions continue to be valid when used as predicate offenses
for an enhancement statute. What matters is whether the convictions
were contemporaneously valid; "there [is] no retroactive right to counsel
... simply because that conviction may ultimately contribute to impris-
onment or felony charges." 97 Noting than Spotted Eagle's conviction in
tribal court would be constitutionally invalid because he was sentenced
to jail time, the court nonetheless deferred to tribal sovereignty.98 It mat-
ters not that a conviction contravenes the Constitution; principles of com-
ity and respect for tribal self-determination drive recognition of tribal
convictions.99 Despite confirming the unconstitutionality of Spotted Ea-
gle's conviction, were it obtained in state or federal court, the Montana
Supreme Court deferred to tribal sovereignty and recognized the un-
counseled tribal conviction. 00
87. Id. at 1240-41.
88. Id. at 1241.
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-734(1) (2011).
90. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1241.
91. State v. Spotted Eagle, 2002 ML 831,1 13, affd, 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003).
92. See id. 115.
93. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1244 (citing "procedural irregularities" and reliance on an
overturned U.S. Supreme Court case as reasons why Ant is not persuasive).
94. See id. at 1242.
95. Id. (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979)).
96. See id at 1242-43 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746-47 (1994)).
97. Id. at 1243.
98. See id at 1243-44.
99. See id at 1245 (noting that respect for the "quasi-sovereignty" of tribes is consistent with
Montana's public policy).
100. See id. at 1246.
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The Ninth Circuit does not recognize un-counseled tribal convic-
tions if they would not have been valid in an American court.o' The
Eighth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, recognize tribal convictions
so long as they comport with tribal law.102 In December 2011, Mr.
Shavanaux petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision to reverse the dismissal of his federal charge. The Court,
however, declined to review Mr. Shavanaux's petition. 0 3 Consequently,
the ambiguity in how tribal judgments should be recognized in American
courts will persist.
II. UNITED STA TES V. SHA VANA UX
A. Facts
In 2010, a Utah federal district court indicted Adam Shavanaux on
his third domestic assault charge. 104 Because this was his third time, he
was charged with a felony under the federal habitual domestic assault
offender statute.105 Ordinarily, applying an enhancement statute would be
pro forma if based on prior state court convictions obtained with the full
panoply of constitutional protections. However, Mr. Shavanaux is an
enrolled member' 0 6 of the Ute Tribe. 0 7 His first two convictions-in
2006 and 2008-were in Ute Tribal Court. 08 Those convictions were
made without an attorney advising Mr. Shavanaux,' 09 which is allowed
under Ute tribal law.o10 At the time of his hearings, Mr. Shavanaux was
indigent and could not afford an attorney. The Ute Tribe does not pro-
vide public defenders at the tribe's expense.1 12 Nor, as it turns out, do
they have to.1 13
101. See United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
102. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 2011).
103. Shavanaux v. United States, No. 11-7731, 2012 WL 896004, at *I (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
104. United States v. Shavanaux, No. 2:10 CR 234 TC, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1 (D. Utah Oct.
4, 2010), rev'd, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011).
105. Domestic Assault by an Habitual Offender, 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
106. To be an "enrolled member" of an Indian tribe usually involves (1) being able to trace
one's ancestry to individuals living in what is now the United States before it was discovered by
Europeans and (2) recognition as an "Indian" by the tribe or community. Under federal law, tribes
are given wide latitude to determine membership. Membership, depending on the tribe, grants a
swath of protections while also bringing the individual within the tribe's jurisdiction while on tribal
land. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 171-73.
107. Shavanaux, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1.
108. Id.
109. Id
110. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(l)(b), available at
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/uteuocode/utebodytl2.htm.
111. Shavanaux, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1.
112. UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(l)(b) ("[B]ut no Defendant shall have the right to have appoint-
ed professional counsel provided at the Tribe's expense.").
113. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2006) ("No Indian tribe in
exercising powers of self-government shall . . .deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right
to ... at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense . . . .").
2012] 531
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Because a tribal court handed down the two prior convictions used
to enhance Mr. Shavanaux's sentence when he was unrepresented, Mr.
Shavanaux challenged his federal conviction as a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.1 4 The district court dismissed Mr.
Shavanaux's federal indictment."' 5 The court relied primarily on a North
Dakota federal district court case, United States v. Cavanaugh,"'6 which
had remarkably similar facts-Mr. Cavanaugh was also charged under
the federal recidivist domestic violence statute using two un-counseled
convictions in Spirit Lake Tribal Court as the predicate domestic as-
saults.'17
Guided by Cavanaugh, the Utah federal district court determined
that tribal courts are not subject to limits in the Constitution, but rather
are governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act.'18 Mr. Shavanaux's tribal
court convictions did not violate ICRA because ICRA does not mandate
free counsel for indigent defendants." 9 However, problems arise when
prosecutors use un-counseled tribal convictions to enhance federal
charges. The court declared that the right to counsel is "unique" because
the fundamental right to be heard is constitutionally defective if defend-
ants cannot take advantage of that right through counsel. 20 Therefore,
the court concluded that un-counseled tribal convictions could not be
used as predicate offenses under the federal habitual domestic violence
offender statute.121
B. On Appeal
The government appealed the Utah federal district court's dismissal
of Mr. Shavanaux's indictment. 122 Mr. Shavanaux argued that the dismis-
sal should be upheld because "the Sixth Amendment and the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . forbid reliance on his un-
counseled tribal misdemeanor convictions to support a charge under 18
U.S.C. § 117(a)." 23 The court considered each constitutional argument
separately and concluded that un-counseled tribal convictions can be
used as predicate offenses for a habitual offender statute.124 In a unani-
mous three-judge opinion, the Tenth Circuit overruled the district court
and remanded Mr. Shavanaux's case.125
114. See Shavanaux, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1.
115. Id.
116. 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D.N.D. 2009).
117. Id. at 1065-66.
118. Shavanaux, 2010 WL 4038839 at *1.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *2 (citing Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994)).
121. See id.
122. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995 (10th Cir. 2011).
123. Id. at 996.
124. See id. at 1002.
125. Id.
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1. Sixth Amendment
To determine whether the Sixth Amendmentl 2 6 right to counsel 2 7
applied in this case, the Tenth Circuit first "consider[ed] the relationship
between Indian tribes and the United States."l28 The court reiterated that
neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights applies to Indian tribes.12 9
"[T]he Bill of Rights does not apply" because Mr. Shavanaux's prior
convictions were for violations of tribal law.13 0 Because the protections
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not apply, the only limits on
tribal sovereignty are those few basic protections Congress imposes on
tribes.13' Where Congress has not acted, Indian tribes retain control over
aspects of their internal affairs, including enforcing and prosecuting in-
ternal criminal laws.13 2 Therefore, because his tribal convictions com-
plied with ICRA and Ute law, they "cannot violate the Sixth Amend-
ment" and can be used for prosecution under § 1 17(a).133
2. Fifth Amendment Due Process
The court then asked whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendmentl3 4 is violated when "prior convictions ... obtained through
procedures which did not comply with, but also did not violate, the Con-
stitution" are used in subsequent federal prosecutions. 1 The Tenth Cir-
cuit first analyzed the history of federal-tribal relations, concluding that
tribes share important similarities with foreign countries because the Bill
of Rights does not apply to them.' 36 Therefore, tribal judgments are en-
forced according to principles of comity, determinations of which are
guided by the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third Re-
statement).137 According to the Third Restatement, a foreign judgment
must not be given force when (1) the foreign tribunal is not impartial or
ignores due process procedures or (2) the foreign tribunal did not have
proper jurisdiction over the defendant.138 Neither factor was met;139
therefore, the court concluded that Mr. Shavanaux's tribal court convic-
tions met fundamental due process because they complied with ICRA
126. U.S. CONST. amend. Vl.
127. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (holding that the assistance of
counsel is protected by the Constitution as a fundamental and necessary right, and that without it,
justice cannot be ensured).
128. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 996.
129. See id. at 996-98 (discussing the relationship between the Indian tribes and the United
States and explaining that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights applies to Indian tribes).
130. Id at 998.
131. See id. at 997 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
132. See id. (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
133. Id. at 998; 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
135. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998 (emphasis in original).
136. See id.
137. See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987) (listing two
mandatory and six discretionary bases for non-recognition of foreign judgments).
138. § 482(1).
139. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999.
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and Ute tribal procedures. 4 0 Following the logic in Spotted Eagle,14 1 the
Tenth Circuit allowed Mr. Shavanaux's prior tribal convictions because
the court determined the tribal convictions did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.14 2
The Tenth Circuit then bolstered its comity analysis by describing
the extent to which federal courts have recognized foreign judgments.143
It pointed out situations in which federal appellate courts recognized
foreign convictions,'" some of which were obtained without juries. 145
Moreover, federal courts permitted the use of statements made to foreign
law enforcement that would have violated the Fourth Amendment.146
Additionally, evidence obtained abroad is not inadmissible simply be-
cause the procedures do not comply with the Constitution.147 So long as
the procedure meets fundamental principles of due process, the Tenth
Circuit and the Third Restatement encourage foreign judgments and or-
ders to be admitted under principles of comity.148
Mr. Shavanaux also argued § 117 149 violates the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause150 by singling out "Indians," on
racial lines, for prosecution.'' This claim, however, was dismissed; "In-
dian" is not used as a racial classification, but rather as a political distinc-
tion. 5 2 This distinction is a voluntary association whereby a tribal com-
munity recognizes that an individual meets the criteria for member-
ship. ' Due to the "unique status of Indians as separate people with their
own political institutions," regulation is over a "once-sovereign political
140. See id
141. State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245-46 (Mont. 2003) (holding that ICRA treats
tribes as sovereign nations, and therefore, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal court pro-
ceedings). See discussion supra Part 1.C.2.
142. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1000-01; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
143. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1000-01.
144. See id at 1000 (citing United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d. Cir. 2003), rev'don
other grounds by Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005)).
145. See id (citing Unites States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir. 1977)).
146. See id. at 1000-01 (citing, e.g., United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d. 904, 906 (10th Cir.
1974)).
147. See, e.g., Brennan v. Univ. of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The mere
fact that the law of the foreign state differs from the law of the sate in which recognition is sought is
not enough to make the foreign law inapplicable.").
148. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1001; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
481 (1987).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) (granting jurisdiction to federal courts of domestic assaults within
"Indian country" with prior convictions in "Indian tribal court").
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981)
("[Tihe Fifth Amendment imposes on the Federal Government the same standard required of state
legislation by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
151. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1001.
152. See id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 n.24 (1974)); COHEN, supra note 35,
at 171-73.
153. See WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 30.
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communit[y]," not "a racial group."' 54 The statute does not facially treat
Indians differently; therefore, because Congress's intent to target recidi-
vist domestic abusers is rationally related to the government's legitimate
interest in protecting citizens, the statute does not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause 155
III. INTERNATIONAL COMITY OR FULL FAITH AND CREDIT?
This section looks at the two methods for dealing with tribal court
judgments: (1) the comity approach, where before a judgment is recog-
nized, courts ensure that fundamental due process rights were protected;
or (2) the full faith and credit approach, where American courts recog-
nize tribal judgments as if they were rendered in another American court.
Comity, however, is the best approach because it more accurately reflects
the nature of tribal status within the United States.'56
A. How Do Federal Courts Treat Tribal Judgments?
Because of the unique treatment of Indian tribes in American law,
difficulties arise when the two legal systems interact. Although Congress
retains ultimate legislative authority over tribes,' 57 the Supreme Court
has "repeatedly recognized the Federal Government's longstanding poli-
cy of encouraging tribal self-government."' 58 This, however, does little to
answer how tribal judgments should be analyzed. Two schools of
thought have arisen in the courts. Some courts, recognizing the unique
treatment of Indians within the federal framework, analyze judgments
using principles of comity.15 9 Other courts, when determining whether to
recognize tribal judgments, treat Indian tribes as part of the federal union
and use a full faith and credit analysis.160
1. International Comity
Despite the "unique circumstances" presented by Indian tribes,
"comity . . . affords the best general analytical framework for recogniz-
ing tribal judgments."' Comity is "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and conven-
154. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
155. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1002.
156. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997); COHEN, supra note 35, at
658-59.
157. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
158. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
159. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 904 n.151 (citing a wide array of state and federal cases
applying principles of comity).
160. See id at 903-04, 904 n. 148 (listing Eighth Circuit case law using a "full faith and credit"
analysis).
161. Marchington, 127 F.3d at 810.
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ience, and to the rights of its own citizens."l62 The effect of a comity
analysis is to give foreign judgments force "beyond their proper
sphere." 6 3 It is a discretionary decision that turns on the public policy
interests of the court seeking to enforce the judgment.'" The Tenth Cir-
cuit implicitly rejected the full faith and credit approach to tribal judg-
ments' and adopted a comity approach.16 6
Comity generally favors recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.'6 ' There are limited circumstances when the "balancing of
interests" counsel against recognizing foreign judgments.168 The Third
Restatement spells out a framework for deciding when foreign judgments
do not merit recognition.169 The Ninth Circuit articulated a federal court
comity analysis 7 0 by modifying the Third Restatement's test for use
when analyzing tribal judgments.' 7' Federal courts must not recognize
judgments if "(1) the tribal court did not have both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction; or (2) the defendant was not afforded due process of
law." 72 Discretionary factors for non-recognition include the following
circumstances: when the judgment (1) was obtained by fraud, (2) con-
flicts with another enforceable final judgment, (3) conflicts with "the
parties' contractual choice of forum," or (4) when recognizing the judg-
ment is inconsistent with the public policy of the jurisdiction where en-
forcement is sought.17 3
The Ninth Circuit held that "federal courts must neither recognize
nor enforce tribal judgments if . . . the defendant was not afforded due
process of law." 7 4 The due process requirements for comity do not re-
quire a tribe's "judicial procedures [be] identical to those used in the
United States Courts"'75 because comity, ultimately, is a political deci-
162. Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
163. ROBERT PHILLIMORE, 4 COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (T. & J.W. John-
son eds. 1854-61).
164. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 658-59; PHILLIMORE, supra note 163, at 17-18.
165. Cf MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 309 F.3d 1216, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) (refusing to
address full faith and credit because the issue was not raised at trial); NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,
276 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming the separation between Indian tribes and the federal
government).
166. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Courts analyze the
recognition of tribal judgments under principles of comity derived from foreign relations law."); see
also Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing federal court deference to
tribal courts' judgments made within their authority).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 (1987) ("[A] final judgment
of a court of a foreign state . .. is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States.").
168. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
169. § 482 (listing two mandatory and six discretionary bases for non-recognition of foreign
judgments).
170. Wilson, 127 F.3d 805, 809-11 (9th Cir. 1997).




175. Id. at 811.
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sion to give effect to a completely issued judgment.17 6 In Wilson, the
Ninth Circuit adoptedl7 7 the comity factors from an earlier Supreme
Court case laying out how foreign judgments should be treated."' Under
this analysis, due process requires:
that there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial before an im-
partial tribunal that conducts the trial upon regular proceedings after
proper service or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and that
there is no showing of prejudice in the tribal court or in the system of
governing laws. Further, as the Restatement (Third) noted, evidence
"that the judiciary was dominated by the political branches of gov-
ernment or by an opposing litigant, or that a party was unable to ob-
tain counsel, to secure documents or attendance of witnesses, or to
have access to appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the
legal system was one whose judgments are not entitled to recogni-
tion."1
79
When a comity analysis arises, federal courts weigh these factors to de-
termine whether foreign or tribal judgments should be recognized. 80 In
the end, this turns on the due process policy interests most valued by the
court.'8 '
2. Full Faith and Credit
Alternately, some scholars' 82 argue that judgments from Indian
tribes should be afforded "full faith and credit" under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.'83 This argument only stands if one accepts that Indian
tribes have been brought into the "federal union" because the Full Faith
and Credit Clause applies only to states.18 4 However, Congress extended
full faith and credit to judgments of "any State, Territory, or Possession"
of the United States.'85 The question, then, is whether Indian tribes are
included in this extension. Two arguments are advanced to support tribal
inclusion in the federal union: (1) because Federal Courts have never
recognized Indian tribes as fully independent under American law, tribes
are within the federal union; or (2) congressional acts granting "full faith
and credit" to certain aspects of intergovernmental relations are evidence
of Congress's universal intent to bring tribes within the federal union.
176. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1895); COHEN, supra note 35, at 658-59;
PHILLIMORE, supra note 163, at 8.
177. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811.
178. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
179. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
482 cmt. b (1987)).
180. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164; Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810.
181. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 35, at 658-59; PHILLIMORE, supra note 163, at 12.
182. See Clinton, supra note 14 at 936 ("[Tihe Article argues that tribal laws and judgments are
entitled to full faith and credit under the Full Faith and Credit Act. . .
183. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
184. See Clinton, supra note 14 at 900.
185. Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
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The first argument turns on a narrow reading of early Supreme
Court cases. Because cases addressing tribal sovereignty, including the
Marshall Trilogy, never held that tribes are fully independent coun-
tries,186 Comity should not apply to tribal decisions.187 In short, because
Indian tribes are not foreign countries, they must fall within the federal
scheme.' However, this line of reasoning ignores the relationship Indi-
an tribes have with the United States and tries to force an independent
system into the federal structure. Although the Supreme Court has never
treated tribes as completely independent countries, neither the Court nor
the Constitution has equated tribes to states.189 The same cases holding
that Indian tribes are not foreign countries also affirm that tribes are not
states and retain independence over internal affairs.190 Courts continue to
chip away at this independence by allowing some state regulation on
reservations; however, tribes continue to make and enforce their own
laws.19' Even though exactly equating Indian tribes to foreign countries
would be inappropriate due to their differences,1 9 2 it is more important
that tribes have never been pulled completely into the federal structure
and thus retain a measure of independence under the Constitution.
The second argument is that Congress intended to extend full faith
and credit to all tribal judgments because Congress passed laws granting
full faith and credit to tribal judgments in certain situations. 19 Public
Law 280,194 the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,'95 the Maine Indian
Claims Settlement Act,196 and the Indian Land Consolidation Act' 9 7 all
provide for full faith and credit for judgments governed by each act.
Therefore, proponents argue that a similar "full faith and credit" analogy
should be applied to tribes through the Full Faith and Credit Act.198 The-
186. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (finding that tribes are "do-
mestic dependent nations" whose "relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian").
187. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 905 ("Thus, courts enforcing tribal judgments based on
notions of comity analogize tribal courts to foreign governments, precisely the analogy the Supreme
Court rejected . . .
188. See id.
189. See discussion supra Part L.A.
190. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559, 561 (1832).
191. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001).
192. See Lindsay Loudon Vest, Comment, Cross-Border Judgments and the Public Policy
Exception: Solving the Foreign Judgment Quandary by Way of Tribal Courts, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
797, 809-10 (2004).
193. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 907-08.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2006) (requiring tribal customs and laws be given "full force and
effect" when not inconsistent with state law).
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2006) (requiring that federal, state, and tribal court give "full faith
and credit" to tribal judgments regarding child custody proceedings).
196. 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (2006) (requiring that "[t]he Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot
Nation, and the State of Maine ... give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of each oth-
er").
197. 25 U.S.C. § 2207 (2006) (requiring an administrative agency to give "full faith and credit"
to tribal proceedings, pursuant to the statute, regarding land distribution).
198. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 14, at 908.
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se statutes, however, reinforce the idea that full faith and credit should be
used sparingly. If Congress intended to extend this principle to tribes
generally, it would have used its plenary powers to pass a statute compel-
ling all tribal judgments be afforded full faith and credit in federal
courts.1 99 Since Congress did not, the inference is that Congress did not
intend the full faith and credit principle to apply universally to Indian
tribes.
B. Best Practice: International Comity
Tribal judgments should be analyzed using the principle of comity.
Federal courts have afforded tribal judgments full faith and credit since
the mid-1800s. 200 However, in 1997 the Ninth Circuit decided Wilson v.
Marchington and reversed the trend201 by using a comity analysis.202 This
federal course change, however, did not create a uniform practice among
203state courts or in subject areas. Every state except New Mexico and
Idaho204 analyze tribal judgments using comity principles. 205 Comity has
developed through the common law in some stateS206 and has been statu-
torily mandated in others. 207 Despite the prevalence of analyzing tribal
judgments using comity principles, 208 several statutes apply full faith and
credit to child custody proceedings, 209 domestic violence protection or-
ders, 210 and child support awards.21 Regardless of the absence of uni-
formity, comity is the best approach considering (1) ambiguities in the
199. See discussion supra Part L.A.
200. See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A
Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 318-22 (2000).
201. See Clinton, supra note 40, at 40-44 (discussing the specious grounds on which the Ninth
Circuit based its decision to use comity, noting the court's cursory distinctions made between Su-
preme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent and weak historical and statutory support).
202. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 325-27.
203. See id. at 335-36.
204. "Only Idaho and New Mexico afford full faith and credit to tribal courts." Id. at 345. See
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751,
752 (N.M. 1975).
205. See Kelly Stoner & Richard A. Orona, Full Faith and Credit, Comity, or Federal Man-
date? A Path that Leads to Recognition and Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders, Tribal Protective
Orders, and Tribal Child Custody Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 381, 387-88 (2004); see also Leeds,
supra note 200, at 339-45 (stating that Montana, Oregon, Minnesota, Arizona, Connecticut, New
Jersey, South Dakota, North Dakota, Michigan, Wyoming, Wisconsin, and Oklahoma use, to vary-
ing degrees, a comity analysis).
206. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 338-39; see also, e.g., Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d
512, 514 (Mont. 1982); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918, 920 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
207. Comity has been mandated either by the state legislature or a judicial rule-making com-
mittee. Some states, e.g., Wyoming and Wisconsin, titled their statutes "full faith and credit" alt-
hough the statutes are more analogous to a comity analysis. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 341-44;
see also, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (2011); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 5-1-111 (2011); N.D. R. CT. 7.2.
208. Federal statutes mandating full faith and credit for certain tribal judgments are mirrored
by the states. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 336-37.
209. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 62D.200 (2010).
210. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §
33.090 (2010).
211. See, e.g., Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2006).
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Full Faith and Credit Act,2 12 (2) the framework of federal-tribal relations,
and (3) international law.
1. Ambiguities in the Full Faith and Credit Act
The Full Faith and Credit Act facilitates cooperation between courts
within the United States by mandating recognition of "records and judi-
cial proceedings."2 13 In rejecting the full faith and credit approach, the
Ninth Circuit properly focused on the interpretation of the statute's ap-
plicability. 2 14 It concluded that the Act applied only to states; tribes were
not intended to fall within the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Act.2 15
Much of the scholarly debate has focused around asymmetrical language
in the statute:216 "any court of any such State, Territory, or Possession"
versus "every court within the United States."2 17 The former suggests a
political delineation, while the latter invokes geography.
Arguments favoring the geographic interpretation, which would in-
clude tribes, say it is the "most obvious interpretation . . . [because] this
meaning renders co-extensive the phrase used to describe enforcing
courts . . . and the phrase employed to describe issuing courts."218 How-
ever, this argument is concerned with reciprocity. It is concerned that the
political interpretation would mandate that a court enforce a judgment
from a foreign court that would not be required to enforce a judgment
were their positions reversed.2 1 9 However, this argument ignores the in-
dependence tribal courts enjoy by focusing on reciprocity, which is no
longer a comity requirement. 2 2 0 The Ninth Circuit, not without contro-
versy, adopted the political interpretation.22 1 Under this framework,
tribes are not within the scope of the Act, and therefore, tribal judgments
are not afforded full faith and credit.
212. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (referring to any "State, Territory, or Possession" in applying
full faith and credit).
213. Id.
214. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997); Clinton, supra note 40, at
40 ("[T]he Ninth Circuit recognized that the real issue turned not on the constitutional language but
the interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Act.").
215. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 808 ("By its terms, the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only to
the states. Nothing in debates of the Constitutional Convention concerning the clause indicates the
framers thought the clause would apply to Indian tribes.").
216. See Clinton, supra note 40, at 26-29.
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (emphasis added).
218. Clinton, supra note 40, at 28.
219. See id.
220. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (noting the reciprocity for comity has "fallen into disfavor");
Leeds, supra note 200, at 326 n.74, 335 (explaining that reciprocity is no longer considered in a
comity analysis, although it may be considered for the '"public policy' discretionary exemption").
221. Clinton, supra note 40, at 43.
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2. Are Tribes Within the Federal Framework?
Recognizing tribal judgments using full faith and credit necessarily
requires that tribes be fully within the federal framework.222 The history
of tribal relations and the autonomy tribes continue to enjoy, however,
counsel against including them fully within the federal framework.223
First, the fundamental rules governing the relationship between tribes
and the federal government were based on principles of international
law, adapted to the needs of the United States.224 Early interactions with
tribes were made through treaties,225 even though tribes were declared
"domestic dependent nations." 22 6 That "phrase placed tribes outside the
scope of Article III" while declaring that tribes are still subject to federal
authority.227 The Commerce Clause also demonstrates this separation by
treating "Indian Tribes" as distinct entities from states and foreign coun-
tries.2 2 8 Tribes also never consented to federal supremacy. 229 Despite
Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs, tribes retain a high level of
autonomy, especially in internal affairs such as administering justice.2 30
When the Supreme Court articulated the international comity analy-
sis, it defined a foreign nation for that analysis.2 3 1 Justice Gray deter-
mined that "[n]o sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to exe-
cute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of anoth-
er state."232 Tribes are not bound by a "special compact" that compels
recognition of other jurisdiction's judgments; rather, they have the "au-
thority to execute, within their dominions, judgments rendered by tribu-
nals of other jurisdictions."2 33 The Constitution does not apply to Indian
tribes 234 because tribal governments are allowed to exercise their auton-
omy to form whatever kind of government they choose.235 Additionally,
tribes retain jurisdiction over many criminal offenses,2 36 have police
222. See Leeds, supra note 200, at 334-35.
223. See HOWARD MEREDITH, MODERN AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS 140 (1993).
224. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1902); Stephens v. Cher-
okee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 486-88 (1899); see also COHEN, supra note 35, at 156.
225. See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 15, at 6-8.
226. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (emphasis added). This recognizes that
although tribes are within the geographic territory of the United States they retain a level of autono-
my. See id.
227. Leeds, supra note 200, at 319.
228. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."); WILKINS &
LOMAWAIMA, supra note 15, at 5.
229. See Clinton, supra note 14, at 873 (noting that tribes were defacto incorporated into the
federal union and exist as "distinct peoples and sovereigns within the federal union").
230. See MEREDITH, supra note 223, at 86; see also discussion supra Part 1.B.
231. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166 (1895).
232. Id. (quoting HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 147 (8th ed.
1866)).
233. Stoner & Orona, supra note 205, at 388.
234. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896).
235. See PEVAR, supra note 36, at 88.
236. See GARROW & DEER, supra note 58, at 79.
2012] 541
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
powers, administer justice within their jurisdiction, determine tribal
membership and exclusion, can charter business organizations, and have
sovereign immunity. 237 Therefore, tribes are best considered "foreign
nations," which then requires an international comity analysis when de-
termining whether to give force to a tribal judgment in American
court.238
3. International Law and Tribal Self-Governance
Principles of international law also support treating Indian tribes as
independent, sovereign entities. In 1992, the United States signed239 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),240 which
guarantees that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination ... [to]
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development." 24 1 Countries that are party to the
ICCPR are obligated to give this guarantee effect,2 42 which would require
the United States to provide some level of autonomy to tribes.243 Addi-
tionally, in his definitive text on American Indian law, Felix Cohen ar-
gued that an emerging custom of international law commands countries
to recognize an internal peoples' right to self-determination.244 Similar to
ICCPR's mandate, 24 5 this custom requires that countries with non-self
governing internal populations foster autonomous self-governance. 246
Antonio Cassese, a prominent international legal scholar, tempered the
breadth of self-determination by noting that international law does not
require governments to do anything other than "not decide the life and
future of peoples at their discretion." 247 This mandate is a loose standard,
but internal populations must at least be allowed "to express their wishes
in matters concerning their condition." 24 8
237. See WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 33-36; see also PEVAR, supra note 36, at 143-45.
238. See Montr6 D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1228 (2007); Stoner & Orona, supra note 205, at 388. But see Kevin K.
Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 420 (2004) (arguing that
the ease of travel between reservations and the U.S., the level of cooperation between tribal and state
and federal officials, and the reservations' location within contiguous U.S. territory, counsel in favor
of treating tribes as within the federal framework).
239. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (1992).
240. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
241. Id. art. 1, para. 1; see also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 101
(1995).
242. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 240, art.2.
243. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 461-65.
244. See id. at 473-78. What constitutes a "people" is not agreed upon. However, a workable
definition, which Indian tribes would meet, is in the ICCPR's protection of "ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 240, art. 27.
245. Id. art. 2.
246. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 475.
247. See CASSESE, supra note 241, at 128.
248. Id
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Although there is no clear framework for how the United States
must treat Indian tribes, international law sets basic principles for how
countries should act.2 4 9 "Self-determination" does not have specific re-
quirements, 25 0 but does seem to require that internal peoples have control
over their governance. 251' This implies a basic level of autonomy and self-
25governance.252 Because of these basic protections in international law,
tribes should not be considered an entity of the United State that, absent a
statutory command, merit a full faith and credit analysis.
IV. INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR COMITY
The Tenth Circuit made a cursory international comity analysis of
Ute tribal court procedures using the Third Restatement's mandatory
factors. 253 The court concluded that complying with ICRA protects fun-
damental due process rights.254 This section does a more thorough comity
analysis, taking statutory protections and tribal practices into account.
The analysis reveals that Ute tribal practices protected Mr. Shavanaux's
fundamental due process rights. Therefore, Mr. Shavanaux's prior tribal
convictions were properly used in federal court.
Comity is a balance between "preserv[ing] and respect[ing] foreign
nations' sovereignty"255 and ensuring that American courts only enforce
256judgments that comport with fundamental due process. American
courts must understand this balancing test when deciding whether to rec-
ognize a foreign judgment.2 57 Because "foreign" tribunals issue judg
ments, the decision to recognize them has political ramifications.2 58 Ef-
fectively, by refusing to recognize a judgment, the domestic court says
"that a foreign country's judicial and political systems are so fundamen-
tally flawed that they do not provide for impartial tribunals or fair proce-
dures"-an "inherently political" determination.2 59 Courts need to be
mindful of the external effects and political ramifications a decision may
carry, yet their main focus should be on ensuring that the judgment meets
standards of due process.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 132.
252. See id at 143-44.
253. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998-1000 (10th Cir. 2011).
254. See id at 998.
255. Stoner & Orona, supra note 205, at 388.
256. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th CiT. 1997).
257. This Comment focuses on court-to-court recognition of judgments; however, "recogni-
tion" encompasses many more scenarios. Although outside the scope of the Comment, "recognition"
of foreign decrees can include, for example, protection orders, vital statistics and health department
records, and judicial orders such as warrants and commitment orders. See Leeds, supra note 200, at
315-16.
258. See Carodine, supra note 238, at 1223.
259. Id.
2012] 543
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
A. What Process is Due?
A judgment rendered in a foreign court will not necessarily follow
the same procedure as a domestic court-enforcing courts cannot expect
an American style of due process.260 Because enforcing courts must en-
sure that the initial judgment met basic standards of due process, 261 the
analysis requires a fact-intensive case-by-case analysis.262 The Supreme
Court's call for a "fair and impartial" process lays the groundwork for
international due process.2 63 However, more clarity is needed to deter-
mine what process is required.
The fundamental requirements of due process, emphasized by
scholarS264 and echoed by the Third Restatement, 26 5 are (1) adequate no-
tice and (2) fair process. Adequate notice will be satisfied when the for-
eign tribunal meets even basic standards.266 This would encompass actual
or constructive notice, regardless of how that notice was made.267 Fair
process includes "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner." 26 8 Recognizing that foreign jurisdictions are un-
likely to have adopted as complex a due process structure as the United
States, Judge Richard Posner wrote "that the foreign procedure [needs to]
be 'compatible with the requirements of due process of law,"' meaning
"that the foreign procedures are 'fundamentally fair' and do not offend
against 'basic fairness."' 26 9 Although there is no exhaustive list of fun-
damental due process protections, the standard is much less rigorous than
the due process generally applied in American courts. 27 0
B. An International Comity Analysis for Mr. Shavanaux
Applying the international notion of due process to Shavanaux re-
quires an examination of the proceedings in Ute tribal court. The record
260. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811; Carodine, supra note 238, at 1230 31.
261. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895) ("It must, however, always be kept in mind
that it is the paramount duty of the court before which any suit is brought to see to it that the parties
have had a fair and impartial trial, before a final decision is rendered against either party."); Wilson,
127 F.3d at 811 ("A federal court must also reject a tribal judgment if the defendant was not afforded
due process of law.").
262. See Carodine, supra note 238, at 1231.
263. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
264. See Carodine, supra note 238, at 1225-26.
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987) (clarifying due process
requirements in the discretionary categories).
266. See, e.g., Int'l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, SA de CV, 347
F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Notice is an element of our notion of due process and the United
States will not enforce a judgment obtained without the bare minimum requirements of notice.").
267. Id. at 594-95.
268. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
269. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.) (quoting
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1987)).
270. See Carodine, supra note 238, at 1227.
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is sparse on what rights Mr. Shavanaux was afforded.2 7 1 However, study-
ing the Ute Tribe's criminal procedure rules, 2 72 the Indian Civil Rights
Act,27 3 and general tribal practices should be adequate to get an idea of
the process Mr. Shavanaux had. From that, we can glean (1) what sort of
notice Mr. Shavanaux was afforded and (2) the due process protections
he had.
The notice analysis is rather quick. Mr. Shavanaux neither chal-
lenged adequate notice nor is there evidence that his notice was defec-
tive.274 Additionally, the Ute Tribe's criminal procedure rules guarantee
adequate notice.275 With no indication of irregularity, this certainly meets
the "bare minimum" standard for notice.
Fairness of process, however, is more challenging because the term
is not well defimed.276 There are many basic protections granted to de-
fendants in tribal court.2 77 Defendants are given the opportunity to know
the charges against them and the basis on which those charges are
made. 2 78 At trial, defendants can use their own testimony or that of wit-
nesses to present their cases. 27 9 Defendants have the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses.28 0 Additionally, defendants are protected
from self-incrimination,28 1 have the right to a jury trial,282 and can com-
pel witnesses to appear on their behalf.2 83 Tribal courts must afford de-
fendants equal protection of the law and cannot deprive them of liberty
21without due process.284 Therefore, absent supervening events, Mr.
Shavanaux's tribal convictions should meet the international standards of
due process.
271. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995-96 (10th Cir. 2011) (failing to high-
light any procedural detail concerning process afforded to Mr. Shavanaux during Mr. Shavanaux's
tribal court hearings).
272. See generally UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P., available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/
uteuocode/utebodytl2.htm (establishing, for example, that the required notice a criminal defendant
must receive before a prosecution of his rights can begin without his presence).
273. See generally Indian Civil Rights Act 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006) (extending, among
other rights, the writ of habeas corpus).
274. See United States v. Shavanaux, No. 2:10 CR 234 TC, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1 (D. Utah
Oct. 4, 2010) (stating Mr. Shavanaux challenged only the use of his un-counseled prior convictions),
rev'd, 647 F.3d 933 (10th Cir. 2011).
275. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(2), 6, 7 (guaranteeing notice of charges and an arraignment
to inform defendant of the nature of the charges).
276. See discussion supra Part IlICI.
277. See GARROW & DEER, supra note 58, at 329-41 (indicating that such basic protections
include the right against double jeopardy, the right to a speedy trial, the right to compulsory process,
and the right not to testify).
278. See UTE INDIAN R. CRIM, P. 5 (requiring that the complaint support the charge with a
statement of facts and other specifics).
279. Id. 3(3), (5) (allowing defendants to testify on their own behalf and subpoena favorable
witnesses).
280. Id 3(4).
281. Indian Civil Rights Act 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (2006); UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(3);
GARROW & DEER, supra note 58, at 340.
282. § 1302(a)(10); UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 15.
283. UTE INDIAN R. CRIM. P. 3(5); GARROW & DEER, supra note 58, at 337-38.
284. § 1302(a)(8).
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Mr. Shavanaux contends, however, that the right to counsel is a
fundamental component of due process.285 Therefore, according to Mr.
Shavanaux, his tribal court conviction lacked fundamental due process
because he was unable to afford counsel and the Ute tribe does not pro-
vide counsel for indigent tribal defendants; therefore, his tribal court
judgment should not be recognized in federal courts based on a comity
analysis.28 6
At first blush, the right to counsel does not fit within the aforemen-
tioned framework of "international due process." The Third Restatement
tries to clarify "fair process" by stating that being "unable to obtain
counsel . . . would support a conclusion that the legal system was one
whose judgments are not entitled to recognition." 2 87 However, only when
lack of counsel is "so incompatible with . . . fundamental principles of
fairness" should a judgment not be recognized.288 The Sixth Amend-
ment's right to counsel initially guaranteed the accused merely the right
to hire counsel.2 89 The right, however, slowly expanded to recognize that
290counsel is an important protection throughout the criminal process.
The Supreme Court, in 1963, determined the right to counsel was so fun-
damental that states must provide indigent defendants with a lawyer be-
cause "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."29 1 Outside federal
and state courts, however, the right to counsel is not absolute. For exam-
ple, there is no right to counsel for indigent individuals in immigration
proceedings.2 92 In those cases, individuals are afforded more due process
protections only if they can demonstrate the proceedings were fundamen-
tally unfair and there was prejudice.2 93 Prejudice is the difficult element
to meet; Mr. Shavanaux must show "that there is a reasonable probability
285. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 996 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing
Shavanaux's contention that Due Process forbids reliance on his uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tions to support a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1 17(a)).
286. See id.
287. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b (1987).
288. See id. (citing United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1988)). Salim allowed a
French deposition to be used as evidence when it was taken without counsel. This was a violation of
U.S. rules but compliant with French procedure, because French procedure was not incompatible
with American principles.
289. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979); JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 55 (2002).
290. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding that federal criminal
defendants must either have counsel or have waived their right to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (giving defendants "reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel");
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 289, at 55-56.
291. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
292. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 239(a)(1)(E), 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1229(a)(1)(E), 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2005).
293. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482-84 (2009) (evaluating the claim under the
two prongs of the Strickland test). Under the facts of Shavanaux, the first Strickland prong is best
seen as a breach of fundamental fairness.
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that, but for [the fundamental error], the result of the proceeding would
have been different." 294
Ultimately, however, this comity analysis turns on the public policy
interests of the Tenth Circuit.295 No court is required to enforce a foreign
judgment if the result would offend the court's notions of fairness or
policy. 29 6 Even though Mr. Shavanaux was not represented, his funda-
mental rights were not impinged because he was not prevented from ef-
fectively presenting his case. 2 97 Given that his predicate convictions were
not made in an American court and he must demonstrate prejudice in
order to have an opportunity to secure counsel, the Tenth Circuit did not
exercise its discretion to refuse to recognize Mr. Shavanaux's tribal court
convictions. Therefore, according to the Tenth Circuit, the Ute tribal
court judgments were not in conflict with the standards of international
due process or the court's policy.
CONCLUSION
Despite the academic justification for the decision, Mr. Shavanaux
is likely to be sentenced to several years in federal prison. His federal
public defenders made a spirited appeal that the right to counsel is so
fundamental that due process is violated when convictions are made
without counsel.29 8 However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed. The Supreme
Court, additionally, refused to review the Tenth Circuit's ruling.29 9 Were
Mr. Shavanaux's first two convictions made in an American court, they
clearly would have been unconstitutional. But in tribal court, tribal law
and ICRA sufficiently protect fundamental rights. Because Mr.
Shavanaux was convicted on a reservation and not a few miles away in a
Utah state court, he had vastly different procedural protections; to those
unaccustomed to Indian law, this is a baffling result. However, it is the
correct outcome given tribal sovereignty within the federal structure.
United States v. Shavanaux demonstrates that even a routine convic-
tion can raise constitutional questions and invoke international law. A
misdemeanor domestic assault conviction from a tiny corner of north-
eastern Utah forced the Tenth Circuit to analyze how Indian tribes fit
within the federal framework laid out in the Constitution and how to rec-
ognize their judgments. This unique relationship has never truly been
294. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (emphasis added).
295. See PHILLIMORE, supra note 163, at 12.
296. See id. at 14-16 (providing situations when a British court would not enforce valid foreign
judgments because the result offends traditional British values, for example, judgments upholding
polygamy and slavery).
297. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that Mr.
Shavanaux's tribal court convictions complied with ICRA and were therefore constitutionally
sound).
298. See id.
299. Shavanaux v. United States, No. I1-7731, 2012 WL 896004, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
2012] 547
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW
settled-congressional supremacy rules the day, 300 but tribal sovereignty
is not a paper tiger guarantee because tribes retain control over much of
their internal administration.301 Shavanaux reaffirms this concept. The
Tenth Circuit correctly recognized that Indian tribes are not fully within
the federal framework.3 02 Tribes, consequently, can still protect funda-
mental due process rights without following the rigorous procedural pro-
tections American courts apply. This fits perfectly with the principles of
comity-the Tenth Circuit respected tribal sovereignty by recognizing
judgments made within the tribe's competent jurisdiction.
Dan St. John*
300. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998); PEVAR, supra
note 36, at 59.
301. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515, 559 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); MEREDITH, supra note
223, at 140.
302. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998 ("Although Indian tribes are not foreign states, for the
purposes of our analysis they share some important characteristics with foreign states insofar as
tribes are sovereigns to whom the Bill of Rights does not apply.").
* ).D. Candidate 2012. 1 would like to thank Professor Scott Johns for his valuable sugges-
tions and insights. Jesse McLain and Drew Brooks also provided helpful suggestions and edits. My
supportive friends and family were a great inspiration and source of encouragement through the
writing process. Finally, Shavanaux reminds me that even a routine matter can raise interesting,
important questions. It teaches me to persist through stumbling blocks-chances are there is a novel
solution lurking around the comer.
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